Wage Explosion DURING THE DECADE PRIOR TO 1968, most of the industrial countries of the West experienced a period of tranquility in which prices were relatively stable and wage inflation moderate. Then quite suddenly-and, to judge from professional and political reaction, unexpectedly-wages and prices began to rise very sharply. Figure 1 shows the pattern of inflation for manufacturing wages from 1956 to 1971; the break in the trend in 1968 and the ascent to the peak in 1970 are clearly discernible. The wage histories of the seven countries to be considered in this paper are shown in Table 1 .1 In each, wage inflation during the last four or five years rose noticeably over earlier years in the sixties. The wage explosion has tested the ingenuity of economists, and they have not been found wanting. Countless discontinuous time series and special forces have been discovered to explain this surprising movement. But the diagnoses have a suspicious character. It is as if the doctors in a town hit by a plague all cite special factors to account for it: a cold, pneumonia, the population explosion, barometric pressure, in-laws' interference, psychosomatic disturbances, and so forth and so on. Isn't it curious that all the special factors hit all the countries at the same time?
tions Phillips curve. This theory holds that "anticipated" inflation as well as tight labor markets produced the wage explosion.
4. Fruistration theories. Turner and others have argued that the frustration arising from unusually low gains in real net wages have driven labor unions to increase their money wage demands, especially in Britain following the 1967 devaluation.
5. Export-constraint inflation. Several Scandinavian economists have put forth a theory (not directly related to the wage explosion) that argues for the importance of foreign trade prices as determinants of domestic wage and price movements.
Other factors, even less general, are sometimes held responsible for the recent wage explosion:
6. Thresholdfactors. Eckstein and Brinner have argued that when inflation reached a certain level, threshold factors changed the responsiveness of wage demands to past inflation. The same argument has been used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with respect to threshold effects and nonlinearities of response to tightness in labor market conditions in Germany.3 7. Social or labor union militance. Many analysts have joined the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers in seeing the wage explosion as partly the reflection of militance in social relations. They cite "trade union pushfulness" in the British wage inflation, the increasing militancy of labor in Japan, the French revolution of 1968, and "sociological and political factors" in the recent German wage inflation.4 have suggested quite the opposite, a disguised unemployment index. Perry, Brechling, and Lipsey have pointed to increased labor force dispersion as an important structural shift.5 9. Increased reservation price of labor. U.S. and British observers have suggested that workers have had an increasing reservation price for work, due either to psychological changes or to changes in unemployment compensation and other benefits. The effect was to shift out the Phillips curve and to stimulate greater wage inflation than would otherwise have been expected.6 10. Devaluation. British economists are virtually unanimous in citing the British devaluation of 1967 as at least partially responsible for the British wage explosion.7
While some of these special factors may prove to be significant, it is hard to accept such a collection of often ad hoc and for the most part local explanations as the reason for the pervasive inflation. The unmistakable trend revealed in Figure 1 makes the probability that the special factors all occurred at once too remote. But is there any unifying explanation?
Before examining the competing hypotheses, we want to clarify the methodological approach used here. The oversimplified theories presented below do not pretend to give the definitive view of money wage movements in each of the countries involved. Nor is the implication made that a careful analysis of the data or of special factors would not alter the results slightly for theory x or country y, or that the richness of the institutional detail of individual labor markets is adequately discussed. Rather, we are testing whether there is any simple explanation of the pervasive pattern of wage acceleration that all the countries have experienced. If, for example, the excess demand view is the correct one, a relatively straightforward explanation using a simple unemployment variable should turn up some relationship. On the other hand, if the excess demand theories explain little in the simplest formulation, a certain amount of healthy skepticism can properly be applied to further results that show excess demand to be of great significance.
In short, while the methods are very crude, they should cast considerable light on the relative merits of general theories about the wage explosion. It is primarily in the spirit of interpreting recent history that the present results are put forth.
A Monetarist Wage Equation
According to Milton Friedman, "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, resulting from and accompanied by a rise in the quantity of money relative to output."8 If this position is correct anld if changes in the stock of money are exogenous, the recent wage explosion should be explicable on monetarist grounds.
Although no one has, to my knowledge, attempted to use monetarist principles to explain money wage movements, the notion is implicit in the quantity theory framework. The simplest explanation relies on two general principles:9 First, the transactions velocity of money is stable, so that prices are proportional to the ratio of nominal money supply to real output. 9. Several people have pointed out that the assumptions hiere do not correspond exactly to all the views of all the monetarists. Subject to some of the caveats on lags, however, the model here does appear to contain the essence of the strict monetarist position. It should be made clear that the recent and more general work of the monetarists-especially that which is indistinguishable from modern "Keynesian" theoriescannot be tested adequately in the simple model used here.
Second, all real miagnitudes are determined by competitive and other market forces; further, since the real wage is a smooth trend, it can be adequately represented by the assumption of constant growth in (real) marginal productivity.
When these two assumptions are combined, the result, first, is Note that the constant velocity term is now subsumed in ao. Two versions of this theory are used here. In the "constrained" version (1) and (2) are taken literally, and a2 = -a3 = 1. In the "unconstrained" version, a2 and a3 are allowed to find their own values. Because of the customary six-month lag between monetary impulse and the change in income, the money supply is lagged by one-half year in the equations to follow. The basic results for the monetarist wage equations are shown in Table 2 . For the seven countries examined, it gives the coefficients and summary statistics for the unconstrained equations; and, for comparison, it gives the summary statistics for the equation in which the coefficients are constrained to fit the strict monetarist hypothesis.10 10. Several objections have been made against the lag structure used in Table 2 , especiallyagainst the short lag allowed for velocity to return to its proper level. Given the approach used here (see especially pp. 435-36 above), it would be inappropriate to search for the best-fitting lag structure for each variable or each country. Nevertheless, to see whether a longer lag would change the results significantly, one further equation was run, with a three-year distributed lag. The only significant change was an improvement in the standard error for Japan, but the signs continued to be incorrect. We can summarize the results by noting whether, on the basis of estimates from the unconstrained equation, we can reject the strict monetarist hypothesis that a2 = -a:3 = 1. In general (1) the monetarist hypothesis is acceptable if a coefficient is significantly different from zero but not from one; (2) the evidence is insufficient if a coefficient is not significantly different from either zero or one; and (3) the hypothesis is rejected if a coefficient is significantly different from one.11 The results are shown in Table 3 . Plainly, the strict monetarist hypothesis is rejected whenever the evidence is sufficient. In no country is the hypothesis accepted for either coefficient; in ten cases it is rejected. Even the weak hypothesis that the coefficient on the money supply should be positive is unsatisfactory. The coefficients on the crucial monetary variables are significant in two cases: for the United States (with the right sign) and for France (with the wrong sign).
The theory outlined here is perhaps too literal a rendition of the monetarist viewpoint. Some of the complications are noted by Friedman: This phenomenon of prices changing by more than the difference between the change in output and the change in money stock is often observed.... How much velocity will change depends on whether the fall in prices or the rise in prices is 11. The philosophy underlying these definitions is that the monetarist hypothesis must do signiificantly better than the naive hypothesis of a zero coefficient. The criterion is quite close to a likelihood ratio test of the alternatives of zero and unity.
anticipated. Generally, when inflation has stLrted after a period of roughly stable prices, people initially do not expect prices to continue rising. They regard the price rise as temporary and expect prices to fall later on. In consequence, they tend to increase their monetary holdings and the price rise is less than the rise in the stock of money. Then, as people gradually become wise to what is going on, they tend to readjust their holdings. Prices then rise more than in proportion to the stock of money. Eventually people come to expect roughly what is happening and prices rise in proportion to the stock of money.12 In other words, the simple relationship may be complicated by a fall in velocity at the beginning of a monetary expansion, followed by a rise.
One possible reason for the divergence of the coefficients from the unity predicted by the monetarist hypothesis is the movement in velocity noted by Friedman. The idea is that only part of a rise in the money supply is immediately realized in inflation. The rest is realized only with a lag. This might imply, for example, that the proper form is Assuming A ln M, and A ln X, are not autocorrelated, the procedure used above will estimate only a,, and a21, while the monetarist hypothesis is that n ttl Ea,,=-a2i=1
If it seems reasonable to assume that the lag shapes are similar for countries, the estimated coefficients should be similar. According to gives the patterns of residuals-prediction errors-in the seven countries for the four observations since then.14 With the exception of the United Kingdom and Germany, all countries (and the average) showed significant residual wage inflation during the period of the explosion.
In summary, the monetarist explanation of the wage explosion is defective. In the first place, the equations do not perform well over the sample period. In the second, they seriously underpredict wage movements during
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Naive Phillips Curve One of the most popular orthodox explanations of wage behavior is the so-called "naive" Phillips curve. This explanation simply relates the rate of increase of money wage rates or earnings to some measure of labor market tightness, usually the unemployment rate.
The usual form is (5) ln w, = bo + b, where u is the unemployment rate.
14. Using the "unconstrained" version evaluates the theory generously. The constrained version performs far worse.
15. The above estimates are probably charitable specifications for the monetarist point of view because of the endogenous nature of the money supply. It is instructive to note that the regressions shown in Table 2 do best for the United States-where monetary policy is relatively active-and do most poorly for Sweden, Germany, and France-where monetary policy is either absent or dictated by external conditions. The rationale behind the naive Phillips curve usually runs as follows: 16 In a given labor market, wages tend to rise under conditions of excess demand, fall with excess supply, and remain constant when excess demands are zero. Since the aggregate unemployment rate is a good indicator of the general state of labor markets, as unemployment decreases, more and more markets come into a state of excess demand and the general pace of wage inflation increases. Because of the frictions in labor markets, however, rising wages, rather than stable wages, would be expected when excess demand for labor is zero (that is, when vacancies equal aggregate unemployment).
The Phillips curves discussed here use the civilian unemployment rate as the measure of labor market tightness. More sophisticated measures (such as vacancies or the weighted unemployment rate) might be preferable, but the criterion of data uniformity and time limitations ruled out other variables. Table 5 gives the regressions of the naive Phillips curves for the countries studied, and Table 6 lists the residuals during the period of the wage explosion. Clearly, the naive Phillips curves do not perform adequately. Except for the United States and Canada, the unemployment rate is not an important variable explaining wage changes, and for France and the United Kingdom, it has the wrong sign. Nor does it explain the wage explosion, as shown by the substantial errors in Table 6 , although for the United States, it does fairly well until 1971, and much better than the monetarist equations. The wage explosion of 1968-71 cannot be explained simply by excess demand and tight labor markets.
Expectations Phillips Curves
For obvious reasons most econometricians have preferred the more sophisticated versions of the Phillips curve. Almost all of them have included current or lagged price change, along with profit rates, vacancy rates, tax rates, lagged wages, wage dispersion, unemployment dispersion, trade union membership, change in money supply, and no end of dummy variables.
The most carefully studied version, sometimes called the expectations hypothesis, includes a proxy measure of the expected rate of inflation. The basic idea is that wages result from a bargaining process rather than decentralized market mechanisms, and that both sides bargain for increases in real rather than money wages. In the strict accelerationist form, a rise in fully anticipated inflation, other things equal, produces an equal rise in wage Since the estimated autocorrelation of the disturbances in naive Phillips curves tends to be around one-half (for annual estimates), and since, in constructed inflation variables, lags tend to range between one quarter and one year, the universal finding of an expectations coefficient of around onehalf is very suspicious. On the other hand, our constructed estimate is probably reasonably free of estimation bias.20
The results for the expectations Phillips curve are shown in Tables 7 and  8 . At first blush these are more acceptable than those for the naive Phillips curves (compare them with Tables 5 and 6 ). This hypothesis performs particularly well for the United States, and reasonably well for Canada, Japan, and Sweden, a pattern of results that is quite plausible on theoretical grounds. On the other hand, the estimates are unacceptable for France and
Germany.2'
One of the interesting aspects of the results is the coefficient on price expectations, b2. In a test (with the standard t-test and the estimates of the b2 coefficients in Table 7 ) for the possibility that b2 = 1, the accelerationist hypothesis is not rejected for four countries (Japan, Sweden, United Kingdomi, United States) and is rejected for three (Canada, France, and West Germany) (see Table 8 ).
During the period 1968-71, the seven economies exhibit considerable unexplained wage movement even after the sophisticated Phillips curve is taken into account (see Table 9 ). Even so, this explanation seems to suffice for the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. that the autocorrelation in the wage equLation is p, and that wage increases are immediately passed througlh inito prices. If an expected price variable is constructed as price iniflation lagged 6 years, the expected coefficient on the price term will be pa. Thus if p = 0.5 at an annual rate, the bias is as follows: Because the imposed lag is so much shorter than is customary, it appeared useful to test whether a shorter lag would change any of the conclusions of the present paper. The countries for which the lag imposed in the Table 7 results seems too long are West Germany and Japan. When the best-fitting new estimate is substituted, the negative coefficient on the xe term is magnified for Germany, becoming -3.1 in the best equation, and the residuals are very little changed. For Japan, the unemployment variables develop a negative (and therefore unacceptable) sign. Thus (even ignoring possible bias) the imposed lag does not appear to have discriminated unfairly against the expectations Phillips curve. The a priori signs on both coefficients (3 and oy) are positive. The summary results for the two specifications are shown in Table 10 . Neither seems to have much explanatory power. In the frustration Phillips curve, only two of the estimated coefficients on the consumption variable are significantly different from zero (for the United States and West Germany), but they both have the wrong sign. The coefficient on the United Kingdom (the theory's intellectual domicile) is quite plausible, but it is very poorly determined.
The pure frustration hypothesis fares very poorly. The adaptive term (-y) consistently has the wrong sign, as does the composite coefficient (-be). Although the implied coefficients for 3 are plausible, none of the estimates tor it is significant. Given the miserable overall performance of the frustration hypothesis, there seems little point in examining the whole batch of errors for the period of the wage explosion. Table 11 thus deals only with the United Kingdom. The frustration hypothesis, even there, fares no better than its competitors in explaining the wage explosion. 
Externally Constrained Wage Settlements
A final general theory of the movement of money wage rates considers the compatibility of wage movements with payments balance. This theory starts with the proposition that in a closed economy a general inflation of goods and factor prices has practically no real effects. Therefore the only forces that constrain the absolute price level in a country are those relating to foreign trade, in particular export and import prices. Obviously, political, social, or ideological constraints on inflation may also force policy makers to keep inflation within certain bounds.
In the polar case of an extremely small open economy with a large fraction of GNP traded or tradable, under fixed exchange rates, the foreign constraint on prices will be practically completely effective. There are only two exceptions: when the economy is virtually closed (as in the case of the United States), and when exchange rates are effectively flexible.
In the postwar monetary system, a prime macroeconomic target has been defense of exchange rates at their par value. As long as countries were forced to regard exchange rate changes as rare and undesirable events, only three policies were available for accomplishing balance-of-payments adjustment: regulating imports by aggregate demand, affecting capital movements by monetary policy, and holding the domestic price level in line with world prices.26 Of these, only the last can be regarded as a reasonable longrun strategy for balance-of-payments equilibrium and as a substitute for exchange rate adjustments under the Bretton Woods system. What then would be the wage settlenment constrained by balance-ofpayments equilibrium? Under a regime of fixed exchange rates and full employment, equilibrium at a given point of time (on, say, basic balance) will be consistent with a price level of p*(t) 
AIln w*(t) = mo + nA lnp,(t), MO < O,ml > 0.
An externally constrained wage rate is thus one that moves with import prices plus the rate of productivity growth in the export industry. When and where this formulation might be a plausible theory of wage determination depends, first and crucially, on whether a fixed exchange rate system or a monetary union exists.27 It is clearly most sensible in a highly open economy where world (and therefore local) prices are effectively exogenous and firms have strong incentives to keep wages at their equilibrium level. Moreover, where capital is mobile, unions may feel sufficiently threatened to accept the equilibrium rate. If unions do not accept the rate, there will be a squeeze on profits, capital movement, and unemployment in 27. We return to this point below.
the offending industry. Especially if there is differential wage movement among industries, low-inflation industries probably will prosper.
Thus in very open economies, and in exposed industries in less open economies, pressures of the external market are likely to constrain wages to follow the equilibrium rate. The important question is, then, the extent to which the exposed industries will act as a damper or a stimulus to sheltered industries. A Scandinavian model suggests that in periods of full employment, movements in the exposed sector quickly stimulate similar tendencies in the sheltered sector due to "competition for labor in a full employment economy and the 'Solidarity Wage Policy' " of occupational rate equality.28
The question, of course, is how big the exposed sector must be relative to the sheltered sector to nmake it the wage leader. While the exposed sector is quite likely to dominate through this economic mechanism in Sweden and Norway, the proposition is less certain in Germany and France and positively implausible in the United States.
Aside from the pure labor market effect of externally constrained wage rates, the political component of this theory has become increasingly important during the 1960s. The political counterpart of the theory holds that governments have aimed increasingly at full employment, economic growth, and external payments equilibrium as prime objectives. As noted above, the only reasonable manner in which external balance can be maintained is through assuring "price stability," which has come to mean prices that rise no faster than at the world rate. Faced with a crisis in external payments, governments generally turn to a combination of measures restricting capital flows and internal demand, and to wage and price controls (euphemistically called "incomes policies"). To the extent that the economic mechanism fails (for example, when the exposed sector fails to restrain the sheltered sector), governments impose wage and price controls as a substitute.
Although The results of this equation, which are quite encouraging, are shown in Table 12 . For Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the import price term is large and significant, indicating that it could have a large effect on wages.
The errors for the period of the wage explosion are shown in Table 13 . They are small for West Germany, Sweden, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, while they remain pronounced for Canada and France.
29. The original version of the paper allowed a more flexible lag. In order to have a symmetric treatment with other theories, it was felt that an imposed lag would be fairer. No studies allow determining a priori what the proper lag is. Given lags both in recognizing the rise in import prices and in renegotiating wage agreements, a declining lag over three years is reasoniable. What About Incomes Policies?
So far this paper has had little to say about the recent social innovation called incomes policies. This is not because we doubt that incomes policies (in some forms, places, and times) can affect the movement of money wages, but because, to record the conclusion from the study by Ulman and 
Overall Evaluation
This examination of the five general theories of wages permits a tentative evaluation of their performance. With standard errors as the criterion of performance, the theories are ranked in Table 14 , and the best theory for each country is indicated by bold-face type. These rankings show how well the theories explain wage movements in a given country for the overall period of fit, 1955-71. Table 15 shows the summary results for the period of the wage explosion, 1968-71. Here, too, bold-face type is used to denote the best theory. It is equally apparent thatfrustration theories of the wage movement do not perform sufficiently well to be taken seriously. As Table 10 demonstrates, the signs are wrong in almost all regressions. The frustration Phillips curve does better than any other single explanation for the United Kingdom only because the unemployment term has the wrong sign. The only other country for which the frustration theory does well is Japan.
Eliminating the monetarist and frustration theories leaves two general classes of explanations, the Phillips curve explanations and the exportconstraint theories.
The Phillips cturve approach provides an adequate empirical explanation for wage movements in the United States and Canada. This empirical result is supported by the theoretical considerations (outlined above) implying that Phillips curve approaches should do rather better in these two countries than in the others. According to Table 15, the expectations Phillips curve approach gives nearly unbiased predictions during the period of the wage explosion in both these countries. That the wage explosion in the policy, alotig wit/ fiscal policy and other demand determinants, helps determine aggregate demand. Inflation is then determined as the pressure of demand works its way through the system. This partial association of monetary policy with inflation should not be confused with the total association of the monetarist viewpoint. The refutation of the monetarist proposition that "only money matters" does not imply the proposition that "money does not matter." United States and Canada was due to the effects of tight labor markets and the lagged effect of the consequent inflation is, then, the tentatively accepted view.
On the other hand, the Phillips curve does not appear to be an adequate explanation of wage movements in the other, smaller, countries. With the exception of Sweden, the Phillips curve approach is distinctly inferior, and in most cases has incorrect signs (it gives an upward sloping Phillips curve in the United Kingdom!). Clearly, other important forces were at work in these countries.
The export-constraint theory of wage movements appears to be the most adequate explanation for Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In these three countries, it is statistically the most satisfactory. Furthermore, it explains the period of the wage explosion quite well for both Sweden and the United Kingdom, and better than other theories for Japan (see Table   15 ). Table I shows that it is due almost entirely to dips in two countries-the United Kingdom and Germany-caused in the first case by the July 1966 measures in the United Kingdom, which imposed a freeze on wages and prices, and, in the second, by the sharp recession in Germany. If, under a regime of fixed exchange rates, all other countries follow a course of domestic demand management with an eye to maintaining balance-of-payments equilibrium through price restraint, the United States will determine the world inflation rate. This is, formally, the solution to the well-known "n-country problem" in international payments adjustment. If the United States suddenly became active instead of passive with respect to its payments balance (some evidence of this appeared under the new economic policy initiated in August 1971), the payments targets might be inconsistent; in this case other countries might help determine the world inflation rate. As long as the United States is passive in payments policy, it can have the last word in inflation policy.
All this depends crucially on the fact that other countries make a totem of stable exchange rates. With increasing frequency in the last few years, countries have used exchange rates rather than internal wages and prices as the medium of external adjustment. How would the prospects for world inflation change if the trend toward freely floating rates were fully realized? Bankers and hauts financiers hold to the credo that freely floating exchange rates would be "inflationary."37 If the evidence outlined here is correct, the inflationary consequences of floating exchange ratesfor countries other than the United States are indeed serious. If the only firm peg on which to hang domestic prices is the external price level, its removal might well loosen restraints and produce serious inflations in these countries. No one in the dialogue about floating rates has suggested a substitute for this restraint on inflation. 
Symbols and Sources

Discussion
THERE WAS AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION of how far one should go on the basis of Nordhaus' rather simple equations in drawing conclusions either about alternative explanations of inflation or about differences among countries. Saul Hymans pointed out that specialists from each country involved would have far more sophisticated models of their own economies than those used by Nordhaus in testing any of the theories he examines. Lawrence Klein agreed there was a need to explain the current inflation in some unifying way for all the countries involved. But he argued that to do this, one had to take a hard look at every country individually in order to incorporate crucial institutional differences into the wage equations for each before attempting to test any particular theory. In order to estimate common parameters well among countries, it is essential to take account of specific variables or structural characteristics in individual countries. He and several other participants cited institutional factors specific to several countries that they regarded as essential to understanding the wage behavior in each. Robert Solow countered that, while such detailed modeling might be essential for many purposes, he took Nordhaus' paper to address a question for which his more summary equations could be useful: Is there some elementary, common explanation for the sharp acceleration in inflation that occurred in every country for the last several years? Nordhaus concurred with Solow's interpretation and emphasized that he was not attempting to construct the best equation for predicting wage movements in each country. He added that some elaborate predicting equations, such as the OECD equation for German wages, probably had little value for detecting what really governed wage movements since they were constructed after so much experimentation with the data in order to get the best fit to the historical record.
Nordhaus' rejection of the monetarist wage model generated comments from many panel participants. R. J. Gordon felt that the analysis should center on the "academic" statements of Friedman and other monetarists and not on Friedman's "polemic" statements. Gordon found Friedman's academic wage model to be very similar to the expectations Phillips curve equations tested in the paper. William Fellner suggested that the essential core of the monetarist argument was that a change in the fiscal deficit without a change in the money supply has no effect on income because an increase in the deficit "crowds out" an equivalent amount of private expenditures. If this is the essential element in the monetarist theory, Fellner thought it impossible to test its significance without further development of the Nordhaus framework.
Fellner discussed the implications for the behavior of inflation under flexible exchange rates of Nordhaus' results supporting the export-constraint hypothesis. He noted that it is not clear that the introduction of flexible exchange rates would free economic policy makers from their politically perceived obligation to restrain inflation. He contended that it made little difference whether the currency of a country was declining in value under flexible rates or it was on its way to losing all its reserves under fixed rates; in either case, policy makers might or might not assume their anti-inflationary obligations since they might or might not prevent a continuous decline of their flexible rates and might or might not prevent abrupt devaluations of their so-called fixed rates. Lawrence Krause noted that the effect of flexible exchange rates on the domestic economy depends very much on whether deflation or inflation is being transmitted. If it is inflation, flexible exchange rates would make it easier to minimize the domestic inflation effects since exchange rate adjustments would then offset the impact of the external inflation by keeping import prices down.
